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I. INTRODUCTION 
A young woman serves as a secretary to the director of the library 
at a law school.  The professors at the school rotate in serving as director, 
but the secretary remains in her position.  The current director is a 
tenured and distinguished professor, well-loved among students and 
faculty at the school.  He makes frequent demands of the secretary; he 
has the ability to increase her workload as he, himself, takes on novel 
challenges.  The secretary’s duties consist of the administrative and 
“housekeeping” portions of the director’s tasks.  Therefore, he assigns 
her daily work and may overtly or impliedly critique her performance.  
The two work in close proximity, and their shared office is separate from 
the rest of the faculty.  The secretary, if asked, would likely say that she 
“works for” the director, or “reports to” this particular professor. In 
examining the exact hierarchy, however, it is clear that the director has 
no authority to terminate this secretary’s employment; rather, such 
decisions remain in the control of the school’s administrators. 
In this (not unusual) situation, what recourse does the secretary 
have in the event of sexual harassment?  If the director cannot effect a 
significant employment action against her, some courts would consider 
him simply a co-employee; therefore, the secretary might hold the school 
liable if it was negligent in not preventing the harassment.1  Other courts, 
however, would consider the director a supervisor, and might hold the 
school vicariously liable for director’s harassment but would provide an 
affirmative defense.2  The rationale is that employers do not entrust co-
employees with any substantial authority; therefore, the employer should 
not be liable unless it was negligent in its failure to discover or remedy 
the harassing conduct.3  Conversely, employers provide supervisors with 
authority, and this power often aids in supervisors’ misconduct.4 
The question first turns upon the type of harassment, and then, 
ultimately, on the definition of supervisor.  Currently, United States 
federal courts are split on the supervisory standard, with the majority 
most likely considering the library’s director a co-employee for vicarious 
                                                                                                                            
 1 See Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2005); Joens v. Morrell & 
Co., 354 F.3d 938 (8th Cir. 2004); Mikels v. City of Durham, 183 F.3d 323 (4th Cir. 
1999); Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 2 See Mack v. Otis Elevator Co, 326 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2003); Dinkins v. Charoen 
Pokphand USA, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (M.D. Ala. 2001); Kent v. Henderson, 77 F. 
Supp. 2d 628 (E.D. Pa. 1999); Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 
2d 953 (D. Minn. 1998). 
 3 Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1032. 
 4 See id. at 1033. 
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liability purposes under Title VII.5  The Second Circuit, however, would 
apply a multifactor analysis to determine the director’s status.6  Given his 
ability to direct her daily activities and her arguably reasonable 
perspective as to the nature of their employment relationship, the Second 
Circuit might declare the director to be a supervisor and subsequently 
hold the school vicariously liable for the director’s harassing conduct, 
subject to an affirmative defense. 
In the wake of two Supreme Court cases clarifying the standards for 
employer liability in sexual harassment claims, lower courts have 
attempted to implement a test to differentiate between supervisors and 
mere co-workers.  Such a test is necessary because employers are 
vicariously liable (subject to an affirmative defense) for supervisor 
harassment, but liable based on their negligence for co-employee 
harassment.  Part II of this Comment describes sexual discrimination 
under Title VII and the differences between “quid pro quo” and “hostile 
work environment” harassment claims.  Part III addresses the Supreme 
Court precedent on employer liability based on the Court’s holdings in 
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth7 and Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton.8 Part IV of this Comment describes the subsequent lower court 
decisions that led to the current split between the circuit courts.  Finally, 
Part V urges the circuit courts to adopt the broad definition of the term 
supervisor, currently the minority view. 
II. SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
Sexual harassment is unique compared to other discriminatory 
behavior.9  Title VII provides employees a cause of action when those 
who engage in harassment discriminate on the basis of membership 
within a protected class.10  Most other violations of Title VII require an 
adverse change in employment by means of compensation or position;11 
however, an employee can maintain a Title VII claim for harassment 
even if the harassment caused no economic or adverse positional impact 
                                                                                                                            
 5 See Noviello, 398 F.3d at 76; Joens, 354 F.3d at 938; Mikels, 183 F.3d at 323; 
Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1027. 
 6 See Mack, 363 F.3d 116. 
 7 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 8 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
 9 MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & REBECCA HANNER WHITE, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 370 (7th ed. 2008) (“[U]nlike other 
discriminatory behavior, sexual harassment involves much conduct that, in other times 
and settings, is perfectly appropriate.”). 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
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at all.12  Furthermore, an entity may pursue other types of discrimination 
according to its own policy or, at least ostensibly, according to its own 
interests.13  Harassers, however, typically violate policy as opposed to 
complying with it.14  They are more frequently seeking to satisfy their 
own interests rather than seeking to further an underlying purpose of the 
employer.15  Ultimately, this web of agency relations mixed with 
conflicts of personal and business interests creates a question of 
employer liability in harassment cases.16  When should an employer be 
liable for its employee’s harassment of another employee?  When does 
the harasser’s status manifest a sufficient relationship with the employer 
such that it would not be unfair to impute liability to the employer?  The 
judiciary has approached these questions mindful of congressional intent; 
however, the statutory premises of employment discrimination leave 
much room for interpretation. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits sex discrimination in the 
employment context, making it unlawful for an employer “to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”17  The Supreme 
Court has interpreted the statute to protect against harassing conduct 
based on the sex of the victim.18  Without explicit definitions in the 
statute, the Court has relied on congressional intent when interpreting 
and enforcing the statute.19 
A. Quid Pro Quo Versus Hostile Work Environment 
The Supreme Court clarified the law governing sexual harassment 
under Title VII in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, establishing that the 
statutory language does not limit the ability to file suit to “‘economic’ or 
‘tangible’ discrimination.”20  Congress instead intended the statute to 
                                                                                                                            
 12 Id. 
 13 See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (challenging 
alleged discriminatory hiring practices that resulted in skilled jobs for whites and 
unskilled jobs for non-whites); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) 
(challenging the requirement of a high school diploma or passing of intelligence tests as a 
condition of employment unless reasonably related to the measurement of job capability). 
 14 ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 9, at 370. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)–2(a)(1) (2006). 
 18 See Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (explaining that 
sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination as the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission has defined it). 
 19 See id. 
 20 Id. at 64. 
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prohibit a “‘spectrum’” of unequal treatment.21  The Court invoked the 
Guidelines of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 
citing the agency’s definition of sexual harassment.22  The Court noted 
that, while the Guidelines are not controlling, they represent an informed 
and experienced authority that can provide guidance to courts and 
litigants.23 
Importantly, the Court derived two categories of sexual harassment 
from the Guidelines: situations in which sexual misconduct is “directly 
linked to the grant or denial of an economic quid pro quo,”24 and 
situations in which sexual misconduct “has the purpose or effect of 
unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or 
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.”25  
Both types of harassment, the Court concluded, violate Title VII.26  Quid 
pro quo harassment alters the terms and conditions of employment by 
definition.27  To be actionable, however, sexual harassment due to a 
hostile work environment must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to 
alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive 
working environment.’”28  The Court also held that employers are not 
always automatically liable for sexual harassment committed by their 
supervisors.29  Instead of a per se rule, the Court advised lower courts to 
follow guidance from the EEOC and look to agency law in developing 
this area of Title VII discrimination.30 
After Meritor, the Court established that the standard for finding 
that a hostile work environment exists is both subjective and objective.31  
A plaintiff need not suffer a psychological injury in order to maintain a 
non-quid pro quo sexual harassment claim.32  Although Title VII 
certainly prohibits such egregious conduct, that bar is too high.33  Rather, 
                                                                                                                            
 21 Id. (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 
707, n.13 (1978)). 
 22 Id.; see About the EEOC: Overview, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/index.cfm (last visited November 24, 2010).  
The EEOC is the federal agency with the power to enforce the federal laws that make 
discrimination on certain bases illegal in the employment context.  Id.; see infra Part 
IV.A and note 197. 
 23 Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B., 477 U.S. at 65. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1985)). 
 26 Id. at 66. 
 27 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751 (1998). 
 28 Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B., 477 U.S. at 67. 
 29 Id. at 72. 
 30 Id. 
 31 See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993). 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
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the proper standard lies somewhere between “any conduct that is merely 
offensive” and conduct that may lead to a tangible, negative effect on the 
plaintiff’s psyche.34  A hostile work environment is one that “would 
reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive.”35 
The “reasonable person” aspect of the objective standard is 
complicated in harassment cases.  As some scholars and courts have 
acknowledged, men and women (as well as whites, non-whites, etc.) 
have different perspectives of what constitutes harassing behavior.36  For 
this reason, it is more fair to the harassed employee to use a standard that 
considers the position of a reasonable person “with the same fundamental 
characteristics” as the victim.37  While this standard would allow the 
court to consider the specific attribute of the victim that may vary his or 
her experience of harassment, it would not go so far as becoming entirely 
subjective.  Courts have avoided the subjective standard because it 
“would not serve the goals of gender equality to credit a perspective that 
was pretextual or wholly idiosyncratic.”38 
III. EMPLOYER LIABILITY: ELLERTH AND FARAGHER ESTABLISH THE 
VICARIOUS LIABILITY STANDARD 
If one employee harasses another employee, when can the plaintiff 
impute liability onto his or her employer for the harasser’s conduct?  As 
the Supreme Court views it, the answer turns on the relationship between 
the employer and the harasser, and between the harasser and the victim.39  
In two cases decided together, the Court established a standard for 
vicarious employer liability in sexual harassment suits under Title VII.40  
                                                                                                                            
 34 Id. at 21. 
 35 Id. at 22. 
 36 See ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 9, at 382. 
 37 See ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 9, at 382 (citing Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th 
Cir. 1991) (holding that analysis of the harassment should be from the victim’s 
perspective, and stressing that a reasonable person standard would reinforce 
discrimination and fail to understand the victim’s view)); Kathryn Abrams, Gender 
Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 
1203 (1989) (arguing that women experience sexual harassment differently than men 
because: (1) women’s physical and social vulnerability to sexual coercion creates 
discomfort with sexual encounters; (2) women are constantly overwhelmed with sexual 
violence and objectification in both actual and media-depicted forms; and (3) women 
generally hold a more limited view of when and how sexual interactions are appropriate); 
Cf. Victoria Nourse, Upending Status: A Comment on Switching, Inequality, and the Idea 
of the Reasonable Person, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 361 (2004) (discussing the reasonable 
person standard and “switching” in jury instructions, to allow for a change in the ultimate 
objective perspective without altering the substantive law). 
 38 See Abrams, supra note 37, at 1210. 
 39 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998). 
 40 Id.; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
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By adopting the vicarious liability standard, the Court rejected a 
negligence standard for supervisor harassment.41  The Court noted, 
however, that the lower federal courts have uniformly applied such a 
negligence standard to co-employee harassment.42  Therefore, the 
Supreme Court created a liability scheme which turns on whether a 
supervisor or a co-employee has perpetuated the harassing conduct. 
A. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth  
In Ellerth, plaintiff Kimberly Ellerth, a salesperson for Burlington 
Industries, filed a complaint alleging constant sexual harassment by a 
midlevel manager, Ted Slowik.43  Though he was not Ellerth’s 
immediate supervisor, Slowik had the power to hire and promote 
employees subject to his supervisor’s approval.44  Ellerth alleged that 
Slowik repeatedly made “boorish and offensive remarks and gestures,” 
and that on three occasions he made comments that may have constituted 
threats against Ellerth’s employment.45  Slowik first told Ellerth he could 
“make [her] life very hard or very easy at Burlington” in response to 
Ellerth rejecting Slowik’s advances while on a business trip.46  Several 
months later, during an interview for her promotion, Slowik told Ellerth 
she was not “loose enough,” and then rubbed her knee.47  Later, via 
telephone, Slowik denied Ellerth’s request for permission to use a 
customer’s logo in a fabric sample and asked if she was “‘wearing 
shorter skirts yet . . . because it would make [her] job a whole . . . lot 
easier.’”48  Shortly after the phone call, Ellerth’s supervisor admonished 
her about punctuality with customer service, and Ellerth quit.49  She first 
faxed a letter giving reasons aside from the alleged harassment, but later 
sent a letter citing Slowik’s behavior as the reason for her resignation.50  
Ellerth knew about the company’s policy against sexual harassment; 
however, she did not want to report the incidents while employed and 
therefore did not notify anyone at the company with the authority to act 
                                                                                                                            
 41 See Faragher, 524 U.S at 802, 810. 
 42 Id. at 799 (noting that a number of courts of appeals have applied a standard where 
the employer is “liable for co-worker harassment if it ‘knows or should have known of 
the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective 
action’”). 
 43 Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 747. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 747–48. 
 46 Id. at 748. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 748. 
 50 Id. 
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on such reports.51  After receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter, Ellerth 
filed suit alleging sexual harassment and constructive discharge by 
Burlington Industries.52 
The Supreme Court reasoned that since Meritor, the courts of 
appeals had determined that the standard for holding an employer 
responsible for the actions of an employee depended on the type of 
discrimination the victim suffered.53  The plaintiff could impute liability 
to the employer if she or he established a quid pro quo claim.54  Although 
the petition for certiorari sought a specific answer on Ellerth’s quid pro 
quo claim, the Court focused on deciding a standard for vicarious 
liability for harassment claims that did not necessarily reach the level of 
quid pro quo.55 
The Court reasoned that given “express” congressional direction it 
must interpret Title VII through the lens of agency principles.56  While 
sexual harassment by a supervisor is generally not considered to be 
conduct within the scope of employment, which is the normal basis of 
respondeat superior liability, the Court noted that this was not the only 
basis for holding employers vicariously liable.57  The Court looked to the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency (1957) (Restatement), which sets out 
principles of vicarious liability for torts outside of the scope of 
employment in Section 219(2).58  In subsections (a) and (c), the 
Restatement established that a master may be liable for a servant’s acts 
outside of the scope of employment if the master “intended the conduct 
or the consequences” or “the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of 
the master.”59  The Court rejected these subsections as potential grounds 
for imputing liability in the sexual harassment setting because the 
employer did not act with any “tortious” intent and the conduct did not 
involve a non-delegable duty.60 
                                                                                                                            
 51 Id. at 748–49. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 752. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 754.  It is arguable, however, that the use of a 
“tangible employment action” is a recasting of quid pro quo discrimination.  See B. Glenn 
George, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment: The Buck Stops Where?, 34 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1, 14 (1999) (noting that the Supreme Court’s use of “tangible 
employment action” describes a situation that lower courts previously had described as 
quid pro quo sexual harassment). 
 56 Id.  (“In express terms, Congress has directed federal courts to interpret Title VII 
based on agency principles. Given such an explicit instruction, we conclude a uniform 
and predictable standard must be established as a matter of federal law.”). 
 57 Id. at 757. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 758. 
 60 Id. 
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Instead, the Court focused on subsections (b) and (d), which 
imputed liability if “the master was negligent or reckless” or the 
employee used “apparent authority” or “was aided in accomplishing the 
tort by the existence of the agency relation.”61  Lower courts had already 
established a negligence standard for the liability of employers under 
Title VII, and employers were liable if they knew or should have known 
about the sexual harassment but failed to stop the conduct.62  The Court 
noted that this was a minimum standard for the liability of employers and 
Ellerth sought to impose a more exacting rule.63  The Court therefore 
shifted its analysis to subsection 219(2)(d).64 
Subsection (d) involves two distinct bases for establishing employer 
liability: “apparent authority” and “aided in . . . the agency relation.”65  
Apparent authority exists where an agent asserts power that the principal 
has not actually given.66  Because harassment usually involves a misuse 
of actual power instead of a simulation of power, the court rejected 
apparent authority as a basis for liability.67  
The Court noted that “aided in the agency relation” was the more 
appropriate standard.68  The Court, however, determined that the 
standard must require “something more than the employment relation 
itself” because anyone in a working environment might be “aided in” 
committing intentional torts by virtue of the employment context.69  The 
Court further dissected the potential rule, analyzing its application in 
cases where a “tangible employment action” did or did not exist.70  A 
tangible employment action is a “significant change in employment 
status” and includes “hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with 
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant 
change in benefits.”71  The Court noted that lower courts had already 
determined that the employer is vicariously liable if an act of 
discrimination results in a tangible employment action.72  In the context 
                                                                                                                            
 61 Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 759 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 62 Id.; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 799 (1998). 
 63 Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 759. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 760. 
 69 See Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 760 (“Proximity and regular contact may 
afford a captive pool of potential victims.  Were this to satisfy the aided in the agency 
relation standard, an employer would be subject to vicarious liability not only for all 
supervisor harassment, but also for all co-worker harassment, a result enforced by neither 
the EEOC nor any court of appeals to have considered the issue.”). 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 761. 
 72 Id. at 760. 
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of agency principles, the Court explained that vicarious liability is 
justifiable because the harasser could not have taken the “action” without 
the agency relation.73  Only supervisors can make decisions of the 
tangible kind.74  In situations such as the case at hand, however, it is less 
clear whether the agency relationship aids in a supervisor’s harassment 
when it does not result in a tangible employment action.75 
The Court’s ultimate decision therefore combined a number of 
considerations. First, it considered the potential trouble with imputing 
liability by the “aided in” standard regardless of whether a tangible 
employment action occurred.76  Second, it reflected on the holding in 
Meritor, which dictated that agency principles compel vicarious liability 
in supervisor harassment cases.77  Finally, the Court weighed the 
congressional intent and purpose of Title VII: to encourage employers to 
develop anti-harassment policies as well as systems for grievances.78 
The courts of appeals were already in agreement with respect to 
subjecting employers to vicarious liability when a supervisor effects a 
tangible employment action on a subordinate.79  Weighing the above 
considerations, the Court extended that rule by holding that a plaintiff 
may also impute liability to an employer for a supervisor’s creation of a 
hostile work environment, even absent a tangible employment action.80  
The Court, however, provided an escape hatch from such liability by 
noting that if the supervisor has not taken a tangible employment action, 
the employer has an affirmative defense.81  Employers must first show 
that: (i) they “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly 
any sexually harassing behavior,” and (ii) that the “employee 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective 
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”82  
Ultimately, Ellerth did not allege that Slowik caused a tangible 
employment action; however, the Court decided this was not 
                                                                                                                            
 73 Id. at 761–62. 
 74 Id. at 762. 
 75 Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 762 (noting that from one perspective, a 
supervisor is always aided in the agency relation; but from another, a supervisor might 
commit the same acts as a co-employee, so his or her status has little import). 
 76 Id. at 763. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 764 (reasoning that hinging liability on an employer’s effort to develop 
deterrent policies would help limit litigation, as it would foster resolution within 
company procedures).  The Court also noted Title VII’s intended similarity to the 
“avoidable consequences doctrine” of tort law, which would “support the limitation of 
employer liability in certain circumstances.”  Id. 
 79 Id. at 760. 
 80 Id. at 765. 
 81 Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 765. 
 82 Id. 
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“dispositive.”83  Therefore, the Court determined that Burlington 
Industries was subject to vicarious liability, but should have the 
opportunity to assert and prove the affirmative defense.84 
In its holding, the Court only vaguely defined supervisor for the 
purpose of this analysis. This is important because employers may be 
vicariously liable if “a supervisor with immediate (or successively 
higher) authority over the employee” creates a hostile work 
environment.85  Because the Court used the term supervisor but also 
qualified the amount and relational authority of the title, confusion has 
ensued as to the application of this standard.86 
B. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton 
In a companion case to Ellerth, the Court applied the same holding 
to a different set of facts.  In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, plaintiff 
Beth Ann Faragher, an ocean lifeguard for the Marine Safety Section of 
the Parks and Recreation Department (the “Department”) of Boca Raton, 
Florida, worked with other lifeguards under the immediate supervision of 
Bill Terry, David Silverman, and Robert Gordon.87  During the five years 
of Faragher’s employment, Terry subjected the female employees, 
including Faragher, to repeated and uninvited touching, crude remarks 
about women, and specific comments insulting Faragher’s body.88  
Silverman touched Faragher without invitation and made various 
comments about women, sex, and the lifeguards’ bodies.89  Faragher did 
not complain about Terry or Silverman to her management.90  Although 
she told Gordon about the pair’s behavior, she did not consider these 
conversations formal complaints.91  Gordon did not feel that it was his 
responsibility to report the conduct of Terry or Silverman to his 
supervisor or to any other official.92  
The city organized the department with a “paramilitary” chain of 
command.93  Terry was the chief of the Marine Safety Division, and had 
authority to hire, supervise, reprimand, and record any actions he took 
                                                                                                                            
 83 Id. at 766. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 765. 
 86 See infra Part IV. 
 87 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998). 
 88 Id. at 782. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 783. 
 93 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 781. 
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with respect to the lifeguards.94  Silverman was a Marine Safety Division 
lieutenant for four years and then became a captain.95  Gordon was also 
promoted from lieutenant to captain; in this position, the pair supervised 
the lifeguards’ daily assignments and fitness training.96  Within the 
“chain,” the lifeguards answered to the lieutenants and captains, who in 
turn answered to Terry.97  Although the city adopted a sexual harassment 
policy in 1986 and revised and reissued it in 1990, the city failed to 
distribute the material to the employees of the Marine Safety Section.98  
Therefore, Terry, Gordon, Silverman, and many of the lifeguards were 
unaware of the policy.99 
As in Ellerth, the Supreme Court focused on agency law in 
determining that “it makes sense” to impute liability onto employers for 
some conduct made possible by an abuse of supervisory authority.100  
The Court then reasoned that, despite this logic, a vicarious liability 
standard must also consider the Meritor holding that employers are not 
automatically liable for a supervisor’s harassment.101  The Court issued 
the same holding as in Ellerth102 and explained the deterrent effect of the 
affirmative defense, noting that holding employers vicariously liable for 
the actions of supervisors without an incentive to prevent sexual 
harassment from occurring would be “at odds” with the statutory policy 
of Title VII.103  Therefore, with the availability of the affirmative 
defense, plaintiffs who might have found redress for a grievance through 
an employer’s “preventive or remedial apparatus” should not have access 
to damages for a harm that the plaintiff could have avoided.104  
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: DEFINING SUPERVISOR IN THE WAKE OF 
ELLERTH AND FARAGHER 
After Ellerth and Faragher, lower federal courts have faced 
problems applying the defense to specific employment situations.  To 
appropriately apply the defense, the courts have been called upon to 
interpret the definition of supervisor in the Supreme Court’s holdings.  
Shortly after the Court made the defense available, the Seventh Circuit 
                                                                                                                            
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 781–82. 
 99 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 782. 
 100 Id. at 802. 
 101 Id. at 804; see Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). 
 102 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
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defined supervisor narrowly, limiting a plaintiff’s potential recovery 
from employers to situations in which the harasser had authority to make 
tangible employment actions even if he or she did not actually effect a 
change in the employee’s status.105  The First and Eighth Circuits agreed 
with the Seventh Circuit’s approach.106  Similarly, the Fourth Circuit 
took an analogous approach to the definition even before the Supreme 
Court issued its decision on a vicarious liability standard.107 
At nearly the same time, the Seventh Circuit issued its opinion on 
the definition of the term supervisor, the District Court for the District of 
Minnesota issued an opinion that established a broader definition, the 
effect of which would subject more employers to vicarious liability by 
treating more individuals as supervisors.108  The Second Circuit also 
employed a broad definition of supervisor, creating a circuit split.109  The 
Second Circuit, however, remains the sole appellate court to reject the 
narrow, bright line rule; thus, it has adopted a rule that is fundamentally 
more fair to employees while still fulfilling the preventive purposes of 
Title VII.110  The following section will explain the circuit split and 
illustrate the various nuances within the different definitions of 
supervisor in hostile work environment sexual harassment claims. 
A. Narrow Definition 
The Seventh Circuit was the first appellate court to define 
supervisor in the wake of the Ellerth and Faragher decisions.111  In 
Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Illinois, the plaintiff, Lesley Parkins, 
sued her employer under Title VII alleging hostile work environment 
sexual harassment and retaliation.112  As a dump-truck driver, her duties 
                                                                                                                            
 105 Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1034 (7th Cir. 1998) 
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to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline an employee”). 
 106 Joens v. Morrell & Co., 354 F.3d 938, 940 (8th Cir. 2004) ([“[T]he alleged 
harasser must have had the power (not necessarily exercised) to take tangible 
employment action against the victim, such as the authority to hire, fire, promote, or 
reassign to significantly different duties.”); Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 96 
(1st. Cir. 2005) (holding no vicarious liability because the harassers did not have the 
authority to “terminate, discipline, or otherwise affect the terms and conditions of 
[plaintiff’s] employment”). 
 107 Mikels v. City of Durham, 183 F.3d 323, 333 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 108 Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 953, 973 (D. Minn. 
1998). 
 109 Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 125 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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at Civil Constructors included “hauling construction materials and debris 
to and from work sites.”113  From 1994 to 1996, various co-workers 
mistreated Parkins using coarse language and eventually participating in 
uninvited touching.114  In 1996, five co-workers harassed Parkins by 
making suggestive comments about a pornographic picture at the 
workplace.115  On this occasion, Parkins alleged that her co-workers also 
grabbed her.116  Although she complained to her dispatcher and to one of 
the alleged harassers throughout her employment, she did not complain 
to the superintendent or the Equal Employment Opportunity officer until 
after this last incident.117  In August 1996, Parkins filed a formal 
grievance, which spurred Civil Constructors to conduct an investigation 
and ultimately punish the employees.118  While the harassment ceased, 
Civil Constructors did not rehire Parkins for the next season’s work,119 
and Parkins sued, alleging hostile work environment sexual 
harassment.120 
The Seventh Circuit required that the plaintiff show a “basis for 
employer liability” for her hostile work environment claim.121  The court 
acknowledged the Ellerth/Faragher defense and focused on determining 
the essential attributes of a supervisor for the purpose of assigning 
employer liability.122  The court considered the common law of agency 
and the purposes of Title VII, and it reasoned that a nominal supervisor is 
not necessarily a supervisor in this context.123  Then, the Seventh Circuit 
posited that the “essence of supervisory status is the authority to affect 
the terms and conditions of the victim’s employment,” and that such 
authority “primarily consists of the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, 
transfer, or discipline an employee.”124  Using this definition, the Seventh 
Circuit rejected the notion that Parkins’s harassers were supervisors 
because the men had limited authority and control over the work setting, 
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and none of them had the power to “hire, fire, promote, demote, or 
discipline.”125 
Both the Eighth and the First Circuits subscribed to the bright-line, 
narrow approach to decide an employee’s supervisory status.  The Eighth 
Circuit aligned with the Seventh Circuit in deciding Joens v. John 
Morrell & Co., an appeal from summary judgment against a plaintiff 
claiming that her harasser had some supervisory authority over her.126  
Joens worked in a “box shop” in the employer’s meat packing plant, 
where she made boxes from flat pieces of cardboard.127  She recognized 
that the superintendent of the floor was her immediate supervisor, but she 
also alleged that her harasser, the day shift foreman, was a supervisor 
because of his ability to demand that she make more boxes for his 
floor.128  In assessing the employer’s liability, the court adopted its own 
version of the Parkins rule, holding that “the alleged harasser must have 
had the power (not necessarily exercised) to take tangible employment 
action against the victim, such as the authority to hire, fire, promote, or 
reassign to significantly different duties.”129  The court rejected the 
plaintiff’s contention, finding that she had not shown a genuine issue of 
material fact because the harasser had “no direct authority” to control 
her, no real power to discipline her, and no meaningful power to assign 
her more work.130  
Similarly, the First Circuit adopted the Parkins definition in 
Noviello v. City of Boston.131  In this case, the plaintiff worked within an 
extensive hierarchy of Boston’s Department of Parking Enforcement.132  
The plaintiff caused the dismissal of her immediate supervisor by 
reporting an egregious act of sexual harassment.133  Her complaint 
alleged sexual and retaliatory harassment in the months after the initial 
incident by those above her in the department’s hierarchy.134  The 
                                                                                                                            
 125 Id. at 1034–35. 
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workplace consisted of four or five “rungs” of authority; while the 
plaintiff argued that those on higher “rungs” were her supervisors, the 
court rejected such an approach that “elevates nomenclature over actual 
authority.”135  Similarly, the two harassers chiefly involved in creating 
the abusive work environment did not have the authority to “terminate, 
discipline, or otherwise affect the terms and conditions of [plaintiff’s] 
employment.”136  The court decided that the negligence standard of co-
employee harassment applied, meaning that the city would be liable only 
if it knew or should have known about the conduct and did not address it 
appropriately.137 
The Fourth Circuit handed down a similar decision in Mikels v. City 
of Durham, but the court approached the issue in a broader sense and 
considered additional factors that tempered the severity of the bright line 
rule.138  Mikels, a police officer, filed suit after a fellow police officer 
grabbed her face and kissed her on the mouth.139  In its analysis, the court 
first cited Ellerth for the proposition of acknowledging “malleable 
terminology” in deciphering a standard for “supervisory” employees.140  
Then, it suggested that an inquiry “may have to run deeper into the 
details of relationships and particular circumstances” and looked to the 
Supreme Court’s agency reliance as a “touchstone, though not a 
prescription.”141  
Moreover, Mikels considered whether the relationship between 
harassers and victims is such “to constitute a continuing threat to her 
employment conditions that make her vulnerable to and defenseless 
against the particular conduct in ways that comparable conduct by a mere 
co-worker would not.”142  While the court cited an employee’s ability to 
make tangible employment actions as a “powerful indicator” that he is a 
supervisor, it supplemented this factor with a consideration of the 
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victim’s response.143  Quoting the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit 
assessed whether the plaintiff “feel[s] free to ‘walk away and tell the 
offender where to go,’ or does she suffer the insufferable longer than she 
otherwise might?”144 
Although the court detailed its standard as partially subjective, it 
held that Mikels had no real prospect of proving her harasser was a 
supervisor.145  Though he had a higher rank within the police department, 
he had no authority to take tangible employment actions against 
Mikels.146  She also was not isolated from the protective power of other 
direct supervisors.147  Finally, considering Mikels’s conduct as indicative 
of her subjective view of her harasser, the Fourth Circuit decided that she 
“demonstrated [a] lack of any sense of special vulnerability or 
defenselessness deriving from whatever authority Acker’s corporal rank 
conferred . . . [after the incident, she] rebuffed him in an obscenity-and 
profanity-laced outburst[,] rejected his immediately proffered apology, 
and the next day filed a formal grievance against him.”148  The court 
considered this conduct to demonstrate that the plaintiff perceived her 
harasser as a co-employee, not as a threatening and authoritative 
supervisor.149 Although the Fourth Circuit ultimately decided that the 
harasser in Mikels did not rise to supervisory status, the addition of a 
subjective factor suggests a more moderate rule than the strictly objective 
definitions of the Seventh, Eighth, and First Circuits.150 
B. Broad Definition  
Shortly after the Supreme Court issued its holdings in Ellerth and 
Faragher, the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota 
created a broader supervisory standard in Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills 
Health Ctr., Inc.151  The court relied heavily on the factual situation in 
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Faragher to formulate its rule.152  In Grozdanich, the alleged harasser 
was a “Charge Nurse” at a nursing home where the plaintiff worked as a 
“Staff Float Nurse”; while working in his unit, the plaintiff was under the 
harasser’s authority.153  According to the “Objectionable Behavior 
Policy,” a Staff Nurse should report to Charge Nurses unless the Charge 
Nurse was the harasser, in which case the victim should report to the 
Director of Nursing.154  After suffering three instances of sexual 
misconduct in one day at the hands of the harasser, the plaintiff reported 
the misconduct to several superiors, including the Director of Nursing.155 
The District Court reiterated the vicarious liability standards of 
Ellerth and Faragher and decided against a narrow definition of 
supervisor.156  The court observed that, while some courts decided a 
supervisory standard based on an ability to make “significant personnel 
decisions,” there was also “a more indulgent line of case authority 
[before Ellerth and Faragher] which maintained that a low-level 
superior, who retained something less than a plenary authority over 
hiring and firing could be considered a ‘supervisor’” for liability 
purposes.157  Next, the court looked at the specific factual findings in 
Faragher, where the Supreme Court found both harassers to be 
supervisors despite their ultimate inability to hire or fire lifeguards.158  
Although one of the men, Terry, could make such decisions subject to 
higher approval, the other, Silverman, held only the power to make daily 
assignments and supervise work and fitness training.159  Regardless of 
their job responsibilities, the Supreme Court held that both men were 
supervisors for the purpose of imputing liability to the city on the sexual 
harassment claims.160  
Finally, Grozdanich posited that a narrower, bright-line rule 
distinguishing those who “manage . . . daily activities” but may only 
“recommend significant personnel decisions” from those who “have 
plenary authority over all such matters” could cause a negative and 
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insulating effect on employers.161  The unintended consequence of such a 
narrow definition, the court reasoned, is that employers could relegate all 
personnel decisions to a specific department within the company and 
avoid liability completely.162  
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania also defined supervisor more broadly than the Seventh 
Circuit.163  The court proffered three considerations for its ultimate 
determination of a standard for supervisors.164  First, the court considered 
a Third Circuit decision explaining that “the authority to act alone on the 
employer’s behalf, with no other controls, is not required for an 
employee to possess supervisory authority.”165  The court then looked to 
the EEOC’s definition, which the agency had revised after Ellerth and 
Faragher.  In its compliance manual, the EEOC defined a supervisor as 
“(1) the individual [who] has authority to undertake or recommend 
tangible employment decisions affecting the employee, or (2) the 
individual [who] has authority to direct the employee’s daily work 
activities.”166  Finally, the court referenced the Seventh Circuit’s 
definition before rejecting that court’s narrow construct.167   Ultimately, 
it decided that the test is whether the harasser had the “authority to hire, 
fire, re-assign, or demote her or set her work schedule or pay rate, or that 
[the harasser] had the power to take tangible employment action against 
her or affect her daily work activities.”168  The additional factor of 
“affecting” daily activities substantially broadens the scope of 
supervisory authority and promotes a more fact-sensitive analysis, rather 
than relegating supervisory authority only to those who might affect 
serious employment changes on other employees.  
The Middle District of Alabama also determined that a broad 
definition more adequately carries out the purposes of Title VII in 
Dinkins v. Charoen Pokphand USA, Inc.169  This case involved several 
plaintiffs and a number of egregious allegations against various 
employees of the Charoen Pokphand live poultry plant in Alabama.170  
The male employees, supervisors by title, subjected the female plaintiffs 
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to continuous unwanted physical contact and verbal sexual 
harassment.171  In determining vicarious liability, the court rejected the 
Parkins definition.172  While it presents “simple rules for complex cases,” 
it “improperly truncates the Supreme Court’s holdings in Faragher and 
Ellerth.”173  Those cases suggested that analyzing employment 
relationships “involves multifactorial analysis rather than simplistic 
taxonomy.”174  Based on this reasoning, the court decided that an 
employee is a Title VII supervisor “if he has the actual authority to take 
tangible employment actions, or to recommend tangible employment 
actions if his recommendations are given substantial weight by the final 
decisionmaker, or to direct another employee’s day-to-day work 
activities in a manner that may increase the employee’s workload or 
assign additional or undesirable tasks.”175 
The court furthered its analysis by referencing “‘unusual’ 
situations” where a harasser deceives the victim into believing that a 
supervisory relationship exists, when in fact it does not.176  Mindful of 
apparent authority, the court encouraged an approach that examines “the 
totality of circumstances,” or “the overall work environment, the 
structural rigidity of the workforce hierarchy, and the relationship among 
all employees, supervisors, and managers.”177  This included looking at 
an employee’s reasonable beliefs about the harasser’s authority, thereby 
adding a subjective element into the court’s analysis of supervisory 
status.178 
The district courts’ decisions precede the Second Circuit’s decision, 
Mack v. Otis Elevator Company,179 which created the split among the 
courts of appeals. In this case, the plaintiff, an African American woman, 
worked as a mechanic’s helper.180  The company assigned her to assist 
six mechanics in a New York City building, and the collective bargaining 
agreement between Otis and the union designated one employee as 
“mechanic in charge” in situations with more than five mechanics at one 
site.181 James Connolly was the building’s mechanic in charge.182  The 
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collective bargaining agreement gave the mechanic in charge the 
authority to schedule and assign work, direct the employees, assure the 
quality of the work, and monitor safety practices at the sites.183  Indeed, 
Connolly did assign work and overtime hours to the other mechanics and 
helpers at the building, including the plaintiff.184  The plaintiff alleged 
that Connolly regularly made comments about her appearance, often 
changed out of his uniform in front of her, and once grabbed her and 
subjected her to uninvited touching and a kiss.185  The plaintiff 
complained to Connolly’s supervisor about the conduct, asked for a 
transfer, and complained to a union steward.186  Ultimately, the plaintiff 
met with several upper-level employees and union representatives, and 
the group promised to investigate the situation and to transfer her; 
however, the plaintiff did not return to work.187 
In determining a standard for supervisory status, the Second Circuit 
rejected the Parkins definition and aligned itself with the contrary district 
court holdings.188  The court reasoned that the narrow Parkins definition 
focused on the traits of an employee that enable the person to make 
personnel decisions; the Supreme Court held, however, that employers 
may be vicariously liable for conduct not involving tangible employment 
actions.189  Therefore, the Second Circuit decided that whether an 
employer gives an employee “the authority to make economic decisions 
concerning his or her subordinates” is not dispositive.190  Rather, the 
appropriate question in determining supervisory authority is “whether the 
authority given by the employer to the employee enabled or materially 
augmented the ability of the latter to create a hostile work environment 
for his or her subordinates.191 
The Second Circuit, like the District Court of Eastern Pennsylvania, 
relied on the EEOC’s enforcement guidelines to support its definition of 
supervisor.192  The court emphasized that the guidelines are not binding, 
but they are “entitled to respect to the extent that they are persuasive.”193  
This rule continues to operate in the Second Circuit, as both the circuit 
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court and district courts have persisted in applying the broad definition of 
supervisor to establish vicarious liability within hostile work 
environment sexual harassment cases.194  
V. THE BROADER DEFINITION IS FUNDAMENTALLY MORE FAIR 
While the majority of the federal circuit courts that have addressed 
this issue have chosen the narrower definition of supervisor, the Second 
Circuit and several district courts have provided a definition that 
promotes more fundamental fairness in the workforce.  The cases 
demonstrate that hostile work environment claims demand fact-sensitive 
inquiries, but this need intensifies as employment structures deviate from 
simple hierarchies with clear labels.  Employers are currently moving 
toward organizational schemes such as “flattened hierarchies,” or work 
environments with fewer differentials between the executive and the 
low-level employee.195  This model works to maintain loyalty, trust, and 
motivation by establishing a “psychological contract” in which the 
logical impetus for employees is to work toward the employer’s goal.196  
In some ways, minorities benefit from the “new workplace.”197  
There may be new opportunities that would not have sprung out of the 
old, formalistic job ladders; similarly, a flattened hierarchy might create 
jobs that are inherently more equal.198  Still, problems such as invisible 
authority and the power of “cliques” (i.e. peer-based decision making) 
may affect women and minorities negatively.199  All of these implications 
demand a judicial definition of supervisor that the chain of command 
employment scenario may not provide.  Moreover, the phenomenon of 
the “new workplace” suggests that the clear line of the narrow definition 
will not slice so neatly through the matrices of authority that have 
superseded the traditional job ladder. 
To support a bright-line rule separating supervisors from co-
employees without considering the reasonable belief of the victim or the 
extent of the harasser’s actual authority is to sacrifice equity for a small 
amount of judicial efficiency.  Should the Supreme Court resolve the 
split, or should any other circuits weigh in, the broader, multi-factor 
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approach is preferable.  The broad definition aligns with the guidelines of 
the enforcing governmental agency, provides for a more thorough and 
fair inquiry to the litigants, better serves the purpose of Title VII, and 
better suits the developing workplace. Moreover, the criticisms and 
potential pitfalls of a broad definition have not come to fruition in the 
Second Circuit.  Therefore, the rule in Mack provides a superior standard 
of vicarious liability in hostile work environment sexual harassment 
claims. 
A. The Broad Definition Aligns with the EEOC Guidelines  
The EEOC is the federal agency with the responsibility to enforce 
the federal laws that make discrimination illegal in employment on the 
basis of race, color, national origin, sex, age, religion, or disability.200  
The agency also enforces the laws against retaliation, helping to protect 
those who complain, file a charge, or participate in a lawsuit based on 
discrimination.201  Antidiscrimination laws cover most public employers 
with fifteen or more employees, as well as labor unions and employment 
agencies.202  Moreover, the EEOC is responsible for investigating 
charges of discrimination as well as working to prevent discriminatory 
harm with “outreach, education, and technical assistance programs.”203 
The EEOC also promulgates guidelines in the form of regulations, 
which clarify and instruct on various areas of antidiscrimination law.204  
As defined by the regulations, sexual harassment violates Section 703 of 
Title VII, and it includes submission to verbal or physical sexual conduct 
which: (1) impliedly or overtly is a term or condition of employment; (2) 
is used as a basis for personnel decisions affecting the victim; or (3) has 
the purpose of “unreasonably interfering” with the victim’s work 
performance or “creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working 
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environment.”205  Until the Supreme Court issued its holdings in Ellerth 
and Faragher, the guidelines provided a standard of employer liability 
for supervisory harassment; after those decisions, however, the EEOC 
rescinded the provision and instead directs readers to its Compliance 
Manual for the relevant policy.206 
In its manual, the EEOC supplies the definition of supervisor 
adopted by the Second Circuit and classifies potential supervisory 
authority without being limited to the “Supervisory Chain of 
Command.”207  Inside the chain of command, the EEOC’s definition 
embraces both the authority to make tangible employment decisions and 
the authority to direct the employee’s daily activities.208  Explaining the 
former, the EEOC refers to Ellerth to clarify that authority to take 
employment action subject to a superior’s review will still qualify an 
individual as a supervisor if his or her “recommendation is given 
substantial weight by the final decision maker(s).”209  The EEOC also 
elucidates the “direct activities” standard, explaining that such authority 
enhances an individual’s “ability to commit harassment” by assigning 
either more or unpleasant work.210  This type of standard reflects the 
“aided in” reasoning of agency law, upon which Ellerth and Faragher 
relied. The EEOC states that the Supreme Court categorized harassers as 
supervisors despite an inability to effect personnel action.211  Finally, the 
Compliance Manual includes harassment by those whom an employee 
might reasonably believe to be a supervisor.212  In situations where the 
structure of the workplace makes a chain of command unclear or where 
the victim in good faith believes a “superior” has the ability to effect a 
significant employment decision, the harasser may be a supervisor for 
the purposes of vicarious liability.213 
Ultimately, the question is whether (and to what extent) courts 
should defer to the EEOC’s various statutory interpretations.  The 
Supreme Court has established tiers of deference, depending on whether 
Congress has delegated law-interpreting power to the agency.214  
“Chevron deference” applies to interpretations of silent or ambiguous 
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statutes if Congress has delegated law-interpreting authority to the 
agency.215  Such delegation arises if Congress has “explicitly left a gap 
for the agency to fill,”216 and therefore may apply to agency 
regulations.217  In Chevron, the Court held that agency interpretations are 
“given controlling weight” if the agency has been delegated law-
interpreting power.218  For those agency interpretations that are not as 
authoritative as regulations, the Court granted Skidmore deference.219  In 
Skidmore, the Court held that agency interpretations that lack the 
authority of legislative delegation may still be persuasive.220  Skidmore 
deference allows the agency’s interpretation to hold authority based on 
the “thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all 
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to 
control.”221 
The Compliance Manual qualifies for Skidmore deference, but not 
for Chevron deference.222  The EEOC’s guidance is therefore not 
binding, but it controls to the extent that it is persuasive.223  Thus, the 
EEOC’s definition of supervisor, like other interpretive guidance in the 
manual, “constitutes an informed judgment to which some deference 
ordinarily is due.”224  For employers, however, the EEOC is certainly an 
authoritative source of information and guidance.225  Because of the 
power and funding to provide both private and federal employers with 
equal employment education, employers should act as though the 
definitions from the EEOC will align with those of the courts.  
Ultimately, the courts should lean towards the broader definition of 
supervisor based on the recognition that the EEOC is afforded a certain 
level of deference and because the agency promulgates its guidance to 
employers and employees according to its federal administrative 
authority.  
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B. The Broad Definition is More Applicable to a Variety of Employment 
Situations 
Because the broad definition relies on several factors and presents a 
more holistic view of the employment situation, its application better 
suits the numerous employment structures that exist.  First, the broad 
definition ensures that employers cannot avoid liability by delegating the 
authority to take tangible employment actions to specific departments 
within its organization.226  Critics of the narrow Parkins definition worry 
that employers will allow only human resources directors to hire, fire, 
promote, or demote employees; therefore, the bright-line rule would 
unfairly classify actual supervisors as mere co-employees for liability 
purposes.227  With the broad rule, courts may consider a number of 
employment situations and complicated fact scenarios while balancing 
the objective and subjective portions of the standard. This ensures a 
fundamentally more equitable result for the employee while still 
protecting the employer from automatic liability. 
In a later Seventh Circuit decision, Judge Rovner concurred in the 
judgment to suggest that the narrow view is potentially “troubling” in 
some cases.228  She suggested that such a standard “does not comport 
with the realities of the workplace,” specifically where employers run a 
number of worksites and reserve “formal employment authority” to 
individuals at a central office.229  Such a hypothetical employment 
situation is a simplistic but effective way to consider the fit of a bright-
line rule in structures that are not so clear-cut.  As the world of 
employment becomes more creative and complicated in its structure, the 
practicability of a bright-line rule loses its appeal.  
C. The Broad Definition More Effectively Ensures the Prevention of 
Harassment 
The broad definition also better serves the purposes of Title VII, to 
prevent sexual harassment before it occurs and to thereby encourage 
employers to create anti-harassment policies by which employees may 
redress grievances.230  Critics of the broad definition maintain that it will 
leave employers vulnerable to an excessive risk of liability and dissuade 
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employers from creating more complex, yet beneficial, organizational 
schemes.231  This reasoning is flawed. The broad definition of supervisor 
does not impute automatic liability to the employer; the Court has dealt 
with this issue sensitively by creating the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative 
defense.232  By expanding the definition of supervisor, the disparity of 
power between employers and harassed victims levels out.  Creating 
more “supervisors” does not unfairly subject employers to more liability; 
it simply increases the pressure on employers to strengthen the 
affirmative defense.  In this way, the broad rule satisfies the preventive 
purposes of Title VII. 
The effects of this theory have already been manifested in the 
Second Circuit. Various law firms and other companies have issued 
articles and client letters to ensure that organizations understand the 
implications of the court’s decision.233  The messages, concise and 
simplified, advise employers to prepare themselves accordingly to avoid 
litigation or liability.234  Though critics of the broad rule might construe 
the need for a warning as “severe,” a large part of the power for 
prevention lies in the hands of employers.  The court created the defense 
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with the intent that it would hold employees and employers more 
accountable for averting inappropriate conduct and the litigation that 
follows.235  The existence of an employer’s preventive policy, however, 
is an element in both prongs of the defense; the employee’s 
responsibility to reasonably take advantage of corrective opportunities 
depends on the employer’s creation of such opportunities.236  Therefore, 
these warnings are useful; efforts to communicate the law to those who 
must follow it are paramount to effectuating the law’s purpose. 
While preventing harassment is unarguably beneficial to all parties, 
one author posits that the means available to employers in strengthening 
their affirmative defense are unrelated to the ultimate preventative 
purpose.237  In her article, Anne Lawton argues that the lower federal 
courts have allowed employers to use the Ellerth/ Faragher escape hatch 
by simply distributing policies and procedures and offering minimal 
training.238  Lawton calls this “file cabinet compliance,” and provides 
empirical evidence suggesting that such adherence does nothing to 
actually prevent workplace harassment.239  The heart of harassment 
prevention, she argues, lies in changing the “organization’s culture and 
the job gender context.”240  This incongruous effect is not the employer’s 
fault; instead, Lawton suggests that the blame lies with the Supreme 
Court for articulating the defense without foreseeing its ill effects, and 
with the lower federal courts for continuing to implement it as such.241  
Regardless of where the blame lies, this evidence renders the affirmative 
defense much less threatening to employers.  If an employer can satisfy 
its burden with a procedurally sufficient yet substantively ineffective 
policy, this ultimately places the employee at a disadvantage once again. 
Initially, this information seems to cut against the preventive 
arguments for the broad definition of supervisor; however, the definition 
and the results of Lawton’s studies are not causally connected.  It is not 
the finding of more supervisors that drives employers toward superficial 
compliance; in her opinion, it is the affirmative defense itself.  Her 
evidence of misguided incentives therefore speaks more to the ultimate 
playing field of employee versus employer.  That playing field, like any 
with inherent power disparities, must undergo a deeper cultural change in 
an effort to prevent the ills of harassment.  Considering the employer 
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versus employee context at large, the broad definition serves as the best 
counterbalance to the employer’s ability to abuse its affirmative defense.  
Therefore, until the underlying standard or the courts’ application of the 
defense shifts to an understanding of societal gender theory instead of 
rewarding mere “filing cabinet compliance,” the courts should use their 
interpretive tools to construe supervisor broadly and ensure fairness. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
When sexual harassment occurs in modern employment scenarios, 
a broad definition of supervisor is necessary to properly allocate the 
burden onto the employer to defend itself from liability.  The concerns of 
judicial efficiency and the prevention of yet-unseen abuses of the system 
should not outweigh the paramount goal of judicial fairness.  Arguably, 
the presence of a circuit split on the question of what defines a supervisor 
in this context begs for ultimate resolution in the fairest and most 
efficient way.  While a bright-line rule to clearly differentiate between 
supervisors and co-employees might ameliorate the difficulty of deciding 
harassment cases, a broad standard with a powerful incentive for 
prevention will keep such cases largely off the docket.  Following a 
standard that more closely comports with both the Supreme Court and 
the EEOC’s intentions, the lower federal courts can ensure uniformity 
and administrability even without adhering to a simplistic rule.  
Furthermore, a broader definition of supervisor may inspire employers to 
go beyond superficial “filing cabinet” compliance towards an effort to 
improve the employment context in a more socially responsible way. 
Consider again the law school library’s secretary.  If she becomes a 
victim of sexual harassment, justice demands an analysis of her work 
relationships.  What power did her harasser hold?  And what bearing did 
that power have on the victim’s mind?  The court should not find the 
answer to liability in a negative response to a singular question.  
Therefore, any subsequent federal case should adopt the broader, multi-
faceted definition of supervisor in determining vicarious liability for 
hostile work environment sexual harassment claims. 
 
